It all looked so promising. When Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasser Araf at shook hands on the White House lawn in the presence of American President Bill Clinton on the same day as their negotiators signed the Declaration of Principles (13 September 1993) -an agreement to end the nearly century-old conf lict -peace truly seemed to be at hand f or the heart of the Middle East. In the coming months and years, however, the brokered deal unraveled to the dismay of the international community. Over the past two decades, it has been conventional wisdom to blame extremists on both sides f or having successf ully sabotaged the peace process through violence.
In Conflicted Are The Peacemakers: Israeli and Palestinian Moderates and the Death of Oslo, American prof essor Eric N. Budd challenges the reigning narrative and largely succeeds in locating the onus of the breakdown in an imbalance of power, the murky text of the peace accords, and the ambivalent attitudes of the moderate peacemakers.
By the early 1990s, new possibilities existed to end the Israeli-Palestinian conf lict. T he Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) ended af ter more than seven years of bloodshed, and a f our-year Palestinian intif ada (1987-91) against Israel's occupation of Palestinian lands prompted both sides to seek a political solution. Compared to Z ionist and Arab partisans who sought to demonize each other, moderates within the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), of whom Budd characterizes as possessing the f lexibility and credibility needed f or diplomacy, represented a pragmatic, non-violent alternative. Yet, "moderates" are def ined only in contrast to "extremists," and as Budd argues, they tend to bring their own shortcomings and limitations to the negotiating table.
In Chapter Two "T he Road to Oslo," Budd lays out a tripartite methodology to reveal the inherent f laws contained within the negotiating strategies of moderate peacemakers. Although neither wholly concrete nor universal, these three principles, which represent the core of Budd's thesis as applied to Oslo and subsequent Israeli-Palestinian agreements, shed light on the course of negotiations and f urther problematize the ef f icacy of diplomacy in a complex arena of historic resentments. Under Principle 1, the playing f ield of talks is heavily slanted to one side due to the ability of the economically and militarily stronger nation (Israel) to manipulate the agenda of the peace process. According to Principle 2, an implicit ambiguity exists in the moderate position. As a result, agreements of tangible value are seldom produced or achieved. In the f inal and most critical stage of diplomacy, Budd asserts in Principle 3 that moderates neither possess the capacity to dispassionately deconstruct their nationalist narratives nor push their constituents toward f ull reconciliation. In subsequent chapters containing case studies of IsraeliPalestinian peace initiatives, Budd validates his approach to a signif icant degree and raises a plethora of new questions on the dynamics of war and peace.
From Oslo in 1993 to the Camp David Summit seven years later, Budd makes a convincing case that the asymmetrical power relationship allowed the Israelis to set the parameters of the negotiations around their interests. Not only did the Oslo Declaration of Principles f ail to address the realization of a Palestinian state but the Israelis made f ew territorial concessions. For this central insight, Budd cites the late Columbia University historian, critical theorist and pro-Palestinian advocate Edward Said. Indeed, Said's contemporary criticism of Oslo seems to have provided the f oundation f or Budd's f irst principle. Rather than genuine reciprocity and an equal exchange of ideas, prime ministers f rom Yitzhak Rabin (1992-95) to Ehud Barak (1999 Barak ( -2001 , along with Israeli negotiating teams, successf ully f orced the talks to pivot on the security of Israel. From the evidence (including reproductions of all the major agreements in the appendix), Budd has raised a legitimate contention, and the prospects f or a settlement may have well been doomed f rom the beginning as a consequence of the inequity of power.
Compared to Principle 1, the case made f or Principle 2 as a signif icant f actor in the collapse of the IsraeliPalestinian agreements is somewhat less convincing. According to Budd, the adoption of "constructive ambiguity" to move beyond intractable issues produced a f atal vagueness in the negotiated texts. In the absence of detailed provisions on the spheres of legal jurisdiction, the establishment of a police f orce f or the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the holding of elections in the Oslo Declaration of Principles, f or example, constructive ambiguity allowed and perhaps encouraged each side to interpret the accords to its advantage. Although undeniably true in some of the agreements, the negotiators seem to have purposely avoided specif ic language on the most contentious issues in order to f irst establish a broad, workable f ramework to prepare a path f or a permanent settlement.
If the talks had inspired a spirit of peace and a desire to make history among both the elites and their constituents -as Budd rightly claims did not occur, then f urther negotiations would have likely been able to bridge the deepest chasms of conf lict. By the author's own admission, the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement (1995) f ailed despite being designed f or immediate implementation and concretely addressing hot-button issues. Hence, the presence of an asymmetrical distribution of power (Principle 1), the practice of diplomatic ambiguity (Principle 2) and/or the stalled deconstruction of national narratives (Principle 3) does not account f or each and every f ailed Israeli-Palestinian agreement in the last decade of the twentieth century.
As Budd conceives his three principles as tools of analysis rather than inalterable axioms, his study proves to be a trenchant re-examination of the traditional narrative. While he will undoubtedly be accused of either downplaying the impact of domestic and regional politics or taking a pro-Palestinian slant by some scholars, his methodology will likely resonate with political scientists, f oreign policy analysts and historians of diplomacy. Af ter caref ully considering Budd's insights, f ew will be able to look at moderates in the same way again.
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